Last year, in the heat of his campaign, President Barack Obama boasted that he had put al-Qaida "on the path to defeat." This year, with 19 U.S. consulates and embassies closed and the State Department issuing vague warnings against travel anywhere in the world, al-Qaida suddenly seems resurgent — and as frightening as ever.
So which is it: defeated or resurgent? Neither, really.
Al-Qaida hasn't gone away, but it has changed — in a way that makes it less dangerous for Americans at home, but more dangerous for Americans who live in the Middle East and Africa.
Once it was global, but today's al-Qaida has gone local.
This month's threat against Western embassies, for example, was focused on capitals in the Middle East — especially in Yemen, where al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula has been fighting to overthrow a government supported by the United States.
Other attacks by al-Qaida franchises have had a similarly parochial focus, from Mali and Somalia to Pakistan. Even in Libya, where a group loosely connected to al-Qaida attacked the U.S. consulate in Benghazi last year, the operation appeared to stem from a local struggle for power, not a global plot directed by the heirs of Osama bin Laden.
Outside its home territories, though, al-Qaida has failed to strike successfully in the United States or Europe since the 2005 bombing of the London underground — an eight-year slump.
The organization still employs the man some U.S. officials call the world's most dangerous terrorist, Saudi-born bomb maker Ibrahim Hassan Asiri — but Asiri's plots haven't worked so far. In 2009, his underwear bomber got as far as Detroit, but the detonator failed. That same year, Asiri's brother, outfitted with a similar bomb, got as far as the palace of Saudi Arabia's counterterrorism chief — another local target — and blew himself up, but he was the only casualty in the attack.
U.S. officials say they still consider Asiri and his innovative bombs a major threat to aviation security. But note that this month's alerts, based on intercepted communication between al-Qaida leaders in Yemen and Pakistan, didn't focus on planes; they focused on embassies.
In that sense, al-Qaida may be returning to its roots, reprising the kind of plots it successfully employed before Osama bin Laden escalated to spectacular attacks in the West. Before 2001, al-Qaida's main focus was on attacking embassies and other outposts of foreign power in the Middle East and Africa — operations like the attack on the U.S. destroyer Cole off Yemen in 2000 and the bombing of U.S. embassies in East Africa in 1998. According to some scholars, bin Laden's successor, Ayman Zawahiri, always thought it was more cost-effective to strike U.S. embassies in the region than to attempt attacks inside the United States.